350 BC
ON MEMORY AND REMINISCENCE
by Aristotle
translated by J. I. Beare
1
WE have, in the next place, to treat of Memory and Remembering,
considering its nature, its cause, and the part of the soul to which
this experience, as well as that of Recollecting, belongs. For the
persons who possess a retentive memory are not identical with those
who excel in power of recollection; indeed, as a rule, slow people
have a good memory, whereas those who are quick-witted and clever
are better at recollecting.
We must first form a true conception of these objects of memory, a
point on which mistakes are often made. Now to remember the future
is not possible, but this is an object of opinion or expectation
(and indeed there might be actually a science of expectation, like
that of divination, in which some believe); nor is there memory of the
present, but only sense-perception. For by the latter we know not
the future, nor the past, but the present only. But memory relates
to the past. No one would say that he remembers the present, when it
is present, e.g. a given white object at the moment when he sees it;
nor would one say that he remembers an object of scientific
contemplation at the moment when he is actually contemplating it,
and has it full before his mind;-of the former he would say only
that he perceives it, of the latter only that he knows it. But when
one has scientific knowledge, or perception, apart from the
actualizations of the faculty concerned, he thus 'remembers' (that the
angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles); as to
the former, that he learned it, or thought it out for himself, as to
the latter, that he heard, or saw, it, or had some such sensible
experience of it. For whenever one exercises the faculty of
remembering, he must say within himself, 'I formerly heard (or
otherwise perceived) this,' or 'I formerly had this thought'.
Memory is, therefore, neither Perception nor Conception, but a state
or affection of one of these, conditioned by lapse of time. As already
observed, there is no such thing as memory of the present while
present, for the present is object only of perception, and the future,
of expectation, but the object of memory is the past. All memory,
therefore, implies a time elapsed; consequently only those animals
which perceive time remember, and the organ whereby they perceive time
is also that whereby they remember.
The subject of 'presentation' has been already considered in our
work On the Soul. Without a presentation intellectual activity is
impossible. For there is in such activity an incidental affection
identical with one also incidental in geometrical demonstrations.
For in the latter case, though we do not for the purpose of the
proof make any use of the fact that the quantity in the triangle
(for example, which we have drawn) is determinate, we nevertheless
draw it determinate in quantity. So likewise when one exerts the
intellect (e.g. on the subject of first principles), although the
object may not be quantitative, one envisages it as quantitative,
though he thinks it in abstraction from quantity; while, on the
other hand, if the object of the intellect is essentially of the class
of things that are quantitative, but indeterminate, one envisages it
as if it had determinate quantity, though subsequently, in thinking
it, he abstracts from its determinateness. Why we cannot exercise
the intellect on any object absolutely apart from the continuous, or
apply it even to non-temporal things unless in connexion with time, is
another question. Now, one must cognize magnitude and motion by
means of the same faculty by which one cognizes time (i.e. by that
which is also the faculty of memory), and the presentation (involved
in such cognition) is an affection of the sensus communis; whence this
follows, viz. that the cognition of these objects (magnitude, motion
time) is effected by the (said sensus communis, i.e. the) primary
faculty of perception. Accordingly, memory (not merely of sensible,
but) even of intellectual objects involves a presentation: hence we
may conclude that it belongs to the faculty of intelligence only
incidentally, while directly and essentially it belongs to the primary
faculty of sense-perception.
Hence not only human beings and the beings which possess opinion
or intelligence, but also certain other animals, possess memory. If
memory were a function of (pure) intellect, it would not have been
as it is an attribute of many of the lower animals, but probably, in
that case, no mortal beings would have had memory; since, even as
the case stands, it is not an attribute of them all, just because
all have not the faculty of perceiving time. Whenever one actually
remembers having seen or heard, or learned, something, he includes
in this act (as we have already observed) the consciousness of
'formerly'; and the distinction of 'former' and 'latter' is a
distinction in time.
Accordingly if asked, of which among the parts of the soul memory is
a function, we reply: manifestly of that part to which
'presentation' appertains; and all objects capable of being
presented (viz. aistheta) are immediately and properly objects of
memory, while those (viz. noeta) which necessarily involve (but only
involve) presentation are objects of memory incidentally.
One might ask how it is possible that though the affection (the
presentation) alone is present, and the (related) fact absent, the
latter-that which is not present-is remembered. (The question arises),
because it is clear that we must conceive that which is generated
through sense-perception in the sentient soul, and in the part of
the body which is its seat-viz. that affection the state whereof we
call memory-to be some such thing as a picture. The process of
movement (sensory stimulation) involved the act of perception stamps
in, as it were, a sort of impression of the percept, just as persons
do who make an impression with a seal. This explains why, in those who
are strongly moved owing to passion, or time of life, no mnemonic
impression is formed; just as no impression would be formed if the
movement of the seal were to impinge on running water; while there are
others in whom, owing to the receiving surface being frayed, as
happens to (the stucco on) old (chamber) walls, or owing to the
hardness of the receiving surface, the requisite impression is not
implanted at all. Hence both very young and very old persons are
defective in memory; they are in a state of flux, the former because
of their growth, the latter, owing to their decay. In like manner,
also, both those who are too quick and those who are too slow have bad
memories. The former are too soft, the latter too hard (in the texture
of their receiving organs), so that in the case of the former the
presented image (though imprinted) does not remain in the soul,
while on the latter it is not imprinted at all.
But then, if this truly describes what happens in the genesis of
memory, (the question stated above arises:) when one remembers, is
it this impressed affection that he remembers, or is it the
objective thing from which this was derived? If the former, it would
follow that we remember nothing which is absent; if the latter, how is
it possible that, though perceiving directly only the impression, we
remember that absent thing which we do not perceive? Granted that
there is in us something like an impression or picture, why should the
perception of the mere impression be memory of something else, instead
of being related to this impression alone? For when one actually
remembers, this impression is what he contemplates, and this is what
he perceives. How then does he remember what is not present? One might
as well suppose it possible also to see or hear that which is not
present. In reply, we suggest that this very thing is quite
conceivable, nay, actually occurs in experience. A picture painted
on a panel is at once a picture and a likeness: that is, while one and
the same, it is both of these, although the 'being' of both is not the
same, and one may contemplate it either as a picture, or as a
likeness. Just in the same way we have to conceive that the mnemonic
presentation within us is something which by itself is merely an
object of contemplation, while, in-relation to something else, it is
also a presentation of that other thing. In so far as it is regarded
in itself, it is only an object of contemplation, or a presentation;
but when considered as relative to something else, e.g. as its
likeness, it is also a mnemonic token. Hence, whenever the residual
sensory process implied by it is actualized in consciousness, if the
soul perceives this in so far as it is something absolute, it
appears to occur as a mere thought or presentation; but if the soul
perceives it qua related to something else, then,-just as when one
contemplates the painting in the picture as being a likeness, and
without having (at the moment) seen the actual Koriskos,
contemplates it as a likeness of Koriskos, and in that case the
experience involved in this contemplation of it (as relative) is
different from what one has when he contemplates it simply as a
painted figure-(so in the case of memory we have the analogous
difference for), of the objects in the soul, the one (the unrelated
object) presents itself simply as a thought, but the other (the
related object) just because, as in the painting, it is a likeness,
presents itself as a mnemonic token.
We can now understand why it is that sometimes, when we have such
processes, based on some former act of perception, occurring in the
soul, we do not know whether this really implies our having had
perceptions corresponding to them, and we doubt whether the case is or
is not one of memory. But occasionally it happens that (while thus
doubting) we get a sudden idea and recollect that we heard or saw
something formerly. This (occurrence of the 'sudden idea') happens
whenever, from contemplating a mental object as absolute, one
changes his point of view, and regards it as relative to something
else.
The opposite (sc. to the case of those who at first do not recognize
their phantasms as mnemonic) also occurs, as happened in the cases
of Antipheron of Oreus and others suffering from mental derangement;
for they were accustomed to speak of their mere phantasms as facts
of their past experience, and as if remembering them. This takes place
whenever one contemplates what is not a likeness as if it were a
likeness.
Mnemonic exercises aim at preserving one's memory of something by
repeatedly reminding him of it; which implies nothing else (on the
learner's part) than the frequent contemplation of something (viz. the
'mnemonic', whatever it may be) as a likeness, and not as out of
relation.
As regards the question, therefore, what memory or remembering is,
it has now been shown that it is the state of a presentation,
related as a likeness to that of which it is a presentation; and as to
the question of which of the faculties within us memory is a function,
(it has been shown) that it is a function of the primary faculty of
sense-perception, i.e. of that faculty whereby we perceive time.
2
Next comes the subject of Recollection, in dealing with which we
must assume as fundamental the truths elicited above in our
introductory discussions. For recollection is not the 'recovery' or
'acquisition' of memory; since at the instant when one at first learns
(a fact of science) or experiences (a particular fact of sense), he
does not thereby 'recover' a memory, inasmuch as none has preceded,
nor does he acquire one ab initio. It is only at the instant when
the aforesaid state or affection (of the aisthesis or upolepsis) is
implanted in the soul that memory exists, and therefore memory is
not itself implanted concurrently with the continuous implantation
of the (original) sensory experience.
Further: at the very individual and concluding instant when first
(the sensory experience or scientific knowledge) has been completely
implanted, there is then already established in the person affected
the (sensory) affection, or the scientific knowledge (if one ought
to apply the term 'scientific knowledge' to the (mnemonic) state or
affection; and indeed one may well remember, in the 'incidental'
sense, some of the things (i.e. ta katholou) which are properly
objects of scientific knowledge); but to remember, strictly and
properly speaking, is an activity which will not be immanent until the
original experience has undergone lapse of time. For one remembers now
what one saw or otherwise experienced formerly; the moment of the
original experience and the moment of the memory of it are never
identical.
Again, (even when time has elapsed, and one can be said really to
have acquired memory, this is not necessarily recollection, for
firstly) it is obviously possible, without any present act of
recollection, to remember as a continued consequence of the original
perception or other experience; whereas when (after an interval of
obliviscence) one recovers some scientific knowledge which he had
before, or some perception, or some other experience, the state of
which we above declared to be memory, it is then, and then only,
that this recovery may amount to a recollection of any of the things
aforesaid. But, (though as observed above, remembering does not
necessarily imply recollecting), recollecting always implies
remembering, and actualized memory follows (upon the successful act of
recollecting).
But secondly, even the assertion that recollection is the
reinstatement in consciousness of something which was there before but
> had disappeared requires qualification. This assertion may be true,
but it may also be false; for the same person may twice learn (from
some teacher), or twice discover (i.e. excogitate), the same fact.
Accordingly, the act of recollecting ought (in its definition) to be
distinguished from these acts; i.e. recollecting must imply in those
who recollect the presence of some spring over and above that from
which they originally learn.
Acts of recollection, as they occur in experience, are due to the
fact that one movement has by nature another that succeeds it in
regular order.
If this order be necessary, whenever a subject experiences the
former of two movements thus connected, it will (invariably)
experience the latter; if, however, the order be not necessary, but
customary, only in the majority of cases will the subject experience
the latter of the two movements. But it is a fact that there are
some movements, by a single experience of which persons take the
impress of custom more deeply than they do by experiencing others many
times; hence upon seeing some things but once we remember them
better than others which we may have been frequently.
Whenever therefore, we are recollecting, we are experiencing certain
of the antecedent movements until finally we experience the one
after which customarily comes that which we seek. This explains why we
hunt up the series (of kineseis) having started in thought either from
a present intuition or some other, and from something either
similar, or contrary, to what we seek, or else from that which is
contiguous with it. Such is the empirical ground of the process of
recollection; for the mnemonic movements involved in these
starting-points are in some cases identical, in others, again,
simultaneous, with those of the idea we seek, while in others they
comprise a portion of them, so that the remnant which one
experienced after that portion (and which still requires to be excited
in memory) is comparatively small.
Thus, then, it is that persons seek to recollect, and thus, too,