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      it is that they recollect even without the effort of seeking to do so,

      viz. when the movement implied in recollection has supervened on

      some other which is its condition. For, as a rule, it is when

      antecedent movements of the classes here described have first been

      excited, that the particular movement implied in recollection follows.

      We need not examine a series of which the beginning and end lie far

      apart, in order to see how (by recollection) we remember; one in which

      they lie near one another will serve equally well. For it is clear

      that the method is in each case the same, that is, one hunts up the

      objective series, without any previous search or previous

      recollection. For (there is, besides the natural order, viz. the order

      of the pralmata, or events of the primary experience, also a customary

      order, and) by the effect of custom the mnemonic movements tend to

      succeed one another in a certain order. Accordingly, therefore, when

      one wishes to recollect, this is what he will do: he will try to

      obtain a beginning of movement whose sequel shall be the movement

      which he desires to reawaken. This explains why attempts at

      recollection succeed soonest and best when they start from a beginning

      (of some objective series). For, in order of succession, the

      mnemonic movements are to one another as the objective facts (from

      which they are derived). Accordingly, things arranged in a fixed

      order, like the successive demonstrations in geometry, are easy to

      remember (or recollect) while badly arranged subjects are remembered

      with difficulty.

      Recollecting differs also in this respect from relearning, that

      one who recollects will be able, somehow, to move, solely by his own

      effort, to the term next after the starting-point. When one cannot

      do this of himself, but only by external assistance, he no longer

      remembers (i.e. he has totally forgotten, and therefore of course

      cannot recollect). It often happens that, though a person cannot

      recollect at the moment, yet by seeking he can do so, and discovers

      what he seeks. This he succeeds in doing by setting up many movements,

      until finally he excites one of a kind which will have for its

      sequel the fact he wishes to recollect. For remembering (which is

      the condicio sine qua non of recollecting) is the existence,

      potentially, in the mind of a movement capable of stimulating it to

      the desired movement, and this, as has been said, in such a way that

      the person should be moved (prompted to recollection) from within

      himself, i.e. in consequence of movements wholly contained within

      himself.

      But one must get hold of a starting-point. This explains why it is

      that persons are supposed to recollect sometimes by starting from

      mnemonic loci. The cause is that they pass swiftly in thought from one

      point to another, e.g. from milk to white, from white to mist, and

      thence to moist, from which one remembers Autumn (the 'season of

      mists'), if this be the season he is trying to recollect.

      It seems true in general that the middle point also among all things

      is a good mnemonic starting-point from which to reach any of them. For

      if one does not recollect before, he will do so when he has come to

      this, or, if not, nothing can help him; as, e.g. if one were to have

      in mind the numerical series denoted by the symbols A, B, G, D, E,

      Z, I, H, O. For, if he does not remember what he wants at E, then at E

      he remembers O; because from E movement in either direction is

      possible, to D or to Z. But, if it is not for one of these that he

      is searching, he will remember (what he is searching for) when he

      has come to G if he is searching for H or I. But if (it is) not (for H

      or I that he is searching, but for one of the terms that remain), he

      will remember by going to A, and so in all cases (in which one

      starts from a middle point). The cause of one's sometimes recollecting

      and sometimes not, though starting from the same point, is, that

      from the same starting-point a movement can be made in several

      directions, as, for instance, from G to I or to D. If, then, the

      mind has not (when starting from E) moved in an old path (i.e. one

      in which it moved first having the objective experience, and that,

      therefore, in which un-'ethized' phusis would have it again move),

      it tends to move to the more customary; for (the mind having, by

      chance or otherwise, missed moving in the 'old' way) Custom now

      assumes the role of Nature. Hence the rapidity with which we recollect

      what we frequently think about. For as regular sequence of events is

      in accordance with nature, so, too, regular sequence is observed in

      the actualization of kinesis (in consciousness), and here frequency

      tends to produce (the regularity of) nature. And since in the realm of

      nature occurrences take place which are even contrary to nature, or

      fortuitous, the same happens a fortiori in the sphere swayed by

      custom, since in this sphere natural law is not similarly established.

      Hence it is that (from the same starting-point) the mind receives an

      impulse to move sometimes in the required direction, and at other

      times otherwise, (doing the latter) particularly when something else

      somehow deflects the mind from the right direction and attracts it

      to itself. This last consideration explains too how it happens that,

      when we want to remember a name, we remember one somewhat like it,

      indeed, but blunder in reference to (i.e. in pronouncing) the one we

      intended.

      Thus, then, recollection takes place.

      But the point of capital importance is that (for the purpose of

      recollection) one should cognize, determinately or indeterminately,

      the time-relation (of that which he wishes to recollect). There

      is,-let it be taken as a fact,-something by which one distinguishes

      a greater and a smaller time; and it is reasonable to think that one

      does this in a way analogous to that in which one discerns (spacial)

      magnitudes. For it is not by the mind's reaching out towards them,

      as some say a visual ray from the eye does (in seeing), that one

      thinks of large things at a distance in space (for even if they are

      not there, one may similarly think them); but one does so by a

      proportionate mental movement. For there are in the mind the like

      figures and movements (i.e. 'like' to those of objects and events).

      Therefore, when one thinks the greater objects, in what will his

      thinking those differ from his thinking the smaller? (In nothing,)

      because all the internal though smaller are as it were proportional to

      the external. Now, as we may assume within a person something

      proportional to the forms (of distant magnitudes), so, too, we may

      doubtless assume also something else proportional to their

      distances. As, therefore, if one has (psychically) the movement in AB,

      BE, he constructs in thought (i.e. knows objectively) GD, since AG and

      GD bear equal ratios respectively (to AB and BE), (so he who

      recollects also proceeds). Why then does he construct GD rather than

      ZH? Is it not because as AG is to AB, so is O to I? These movements />
      therefore (sc. in AB, BE, and in O:I) he has simultaneously. But if he

      wishes to construct to thought ZH, he has in mind BE in like manner as

      before (when constructing GD), but now, instead of (the movements of

      the ratio) O:I, he has in mind (those of the ratio K:L; for

      K:L::ZA:BA. (See diagram.)

      When, therefore, the 'movement' corresponding to the object and that

      corresponding to its time concur, then one actually remembers. If

      one supposes (himself to move in these different but concurrent

      ways) without really doing so, he supposes himself to remember.

      For one may be mistaken, and think that he remembers when he

      really does not. But it is not possible, conversely, that when one

      actually remembers he should not suppose himself to remember, but

      should remember unconsciously. For remembering, as we have conceived

      it, essentially implies consciousness of itself. If, however, the

      movement corresponding to the objective fact takes place without

      that corresponding to the time, or, if the latter takes place

      without the former, one does not remember.

      The movement answering to the time is of two kinds. Sometimes in

      remembering a fact one has no determinate time-notion of it, no such

      notion as that e.g. he did something or other on the day before

      yesterday; while in other cases he has a determinate notion-of the

      time. Still, even though one does not remember with actual

      determination of the time, he genuinely remembers, none the less.

      Persons are wont to say that they remember (something), but yet do not

      know when (it occurred, as happens) whenever they do not know

      determinately the exact length of time implied in the 'when'.

      It has been already stated that those who have a good memory are not

      identical with those who are quick at recollecting. But the act of

      recollecting differs from that of remembering, not only

      chronologically, but also in this, that many also of the other animals

      (as well as man) have memory, but, of all that we are acquainted with,

      none, we venture to say, except man, shares in the faculty of

      recollection. The cause of this is that recollection is, as it were

      a mode of inference. For he who endeavours to recollect infers that he

      formerly saw, or heard, or had some such experience, and the process

      (by which he succeeds in recollecting) is, as it were, a sort of

      investigation. But to investigate in this way belongs naturally to

      those animals alone which are also endowed with the faculty of

      deliberation; (which proves what was said above), for deliberation

      is a form of inference.

      That the affection is corporeal, i.e. that recollection is a

      searching for an 'image' in a corporeal substrate, is proved by the

      fact that in some persons, when, despite the most strenuous

      application of thought, they have been unable to recollect, it (viz.

      the anamnesis = the effort at recollection) excites a feeling of

      discomfort, which, even though they abandon the effort at

      recollection, persists in them none the less; and especially in

      persons of melancholic temperament. For these are most powerfully

      moved by presentations. The reason why the effort of recollection is

      not under the control of their will is that, as those who throw a

      stone cannot stop it at their will when thrown, so he who tries to

      recollect and 'hunts' (after an idea) sets up a process in a

      material part, (that) in which resides the affection. Those who have

      moisture around that part which is the centre of sense-perception

      suffer most discomfort of this kind. For when once the moisture has

      been set in motion it is not easily brought to rest, until the idea

      which was sought for has again presented itself, and thus the movement

      has found a straight course. For a similar reason bursts of anger or

      fits of terror, when once they have excited such motions, are not at

      once allayed, even though the angry or terrified persons (by efforts

      of will) set up counter motions, but the passions continue to move

      them on, in the same direction as at first, in opposition to such

      counter motions. The affection resembles also that in the case of

      words, tunes, or sayings, whenever one of them has become inveterate

      on the lips. People give them up and resolve to avoid them; yet

      again they find themselves humming the forbidden air, or using the

      prohibited word. Those whose upper parts are abnormally large, as.

      is the case with dwarfs, have abnormally weak memory, as compared with

      their opposites, because of the great weight which they have resting

      upon the organ of perception, and because their mnemonic movements

      are, from the very first, not able to keep true to a course, but are

      dispersed, and because, in the effort at recollection, these movements

      do not easily find a direct onward path. Infants and very old

      persons have bad memories, owing to the amount of movement going on

      within them; for the latter are in process of rapid decay, the

      former in process of vigorous growth; and we may add that children,

      until considerably advanced in years, are dwarf-like in their bodily

      structure. Such then is our theory as regards memory and remembering

      their nature, and the particular organ of the soul by which animals

      remember; also as regards recollection, its formal definition, and the

      manner and causes-of its performance.

      -THE END-

      .

      350 BC

      PHYSICS

      by Aristotle

      translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye

      Book I

      1

      WHEN the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have

      principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with

      these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is

      attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are

      acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have

      carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. Plainly

      therefore in the science of Nature, as in other branches of study, our

      first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.

      The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which

      are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which

      are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not

      'knowable relatively to us' and 'knowable' without qualification. So

      in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from

      what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is

      more clear and more knowable by nature.

      Now what is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused

      masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us

      later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to

      particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception,

      and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things

      within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation

      of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. 'round', means vaguely a sort

      of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses.

      Similarly a child beg
    ins by calling all men 'father', and all women

      'mother', but later on distinguishes each of them.

      2

      The principles in question must be either (a) one or (b) more than

      one. If (a) one, it must be either (i) motionless, as Parmenides and

      Melissus assert, or (ii) in motion, as the physicists hold, some

      declaring air to be the first principle, others water. If (b) more

      than one, then either (i) a finite or (ii) an infinite plurality. If

      (i) finite (but more than one), then either two or three or four or

      some other number. If (ii) infinite, then either as Democritus

      believed one in kind, but differing in shape or form; or different

      in kind and even contrary.

      A similar inquiry is made by those who inquire into the number of

      existents: for they inquire whether the ultimate constituents of

      existing things are one or many, and if many, whether a finite or an

      infinite plurality. So they too are inquiring whether the principle or

      element is one or many.

      Now to investigate whether Being is one and motionless is not a

      contribution to the science of Nature. For just as the geometer has

      nothing more to say to one who denies the principles of his

      science-this being a question for a different science or for or common

      to all-so a man investigating principles cannot argue with one who

      denies their existence. For if Being is just one, and one in the way

      mentioned, there is a principle no longer, since a principle must be

      the principle of some thing or things.

      To inquire therefore whether Being is one in this sense would be

      like arguing against any other position maintained for the sake of

      argument (such as the Heraclitean thesis, or such a thesis as that

      Being is one man) or like refuting a merely contentious argument-a

      description which applies to the arguments both of Melissus and of

      Parmenides: their premisses are false and their conclusions do not

      follow. Or rather the argument of Melissus is gross and palpable and

     

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